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Abstract: 
Road safety has become an increasing concern in developed countries due to the significant 
amount of mortal victims and the economic losses derived. Only in 2005 these losses rose to 
200.000 million euros, a significant amount – approximately the 2% of its GDP- that easily 
justifies any public intervention. One tool used by governments to face this challenge is the 
enactment of stricter policies and regulations. Since drunk driving is one of the most important 
concerns of public authorities on this field, several European countries decided to lower their 
illegal Blood Alcohol Content levels to 0.5 mg/ml during the last decade. This study evaluates 
for the first time the effectiveness of this transition using European panel-based data (CARE) 
for the period 1991-2003 using the Differences-in-Differences method in a fixed effects 
estimation that allows for any pattern of correlation (Cluster-Robust). My results show the 
existence of positive impacts on certain groups of road users and for the whole population when 
the policy is accompanied by some enforcement interventions. Moreover, a time lag of more 
than two years is found in that effectiveness. Finally, I also assert the importance of controlling 
for serial correlation in the evaluation of this kind of policies.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In the programme to promote road safety in 1997 the European Commission estimated yearly 
losses related with road accidents in 45.000 million euros.1 This estimation increased after the 
EU enlargement to 200.000 million - approximately the 2% of its GDP- in 2005.2 Two thirds of 
this quantity are spent in medical care, police intervention and vehicle repairing costs. The rest 
represents a waste of economic production caused by deaths and injuries. Thus, this estimation 
gives a strong argument to consider the reduction of road accidents as an economic objective for 
governments and justifies the implementation of costly measures.  
 
It is already proved and socially accepted that alcohol consumption has a dramatic impact on 
driver’s ability to drive. The European Commission considered in 2003 that at least 10.000 road 
users died every year in alcohol-related accidents costing about 10.000 million euros in social 
value.3 For that reason governments try to discourage drunk driving using specific regulations 
worldwide.  
 
One common policy implemented in developed countries has been setting or lowering Blood 
Alcohol Content (BAC) illegal limits.4 Especially in Europe, this policy has a long tradition and 
recently has lived an imperfect process of homogenisation since 1994.5 From that year on, most 
former EU15 countries lowered their illegal BAC limits, usually set at the level of 0.8 mg/ml, to 
the level already established in other few countries: a BAC limit of 0.5 mg/ml. Since this 
process is almost completed, I consider that it is time to evaluate its results. Therefore, the 
objective of this study is the evaluation of the effectiveness of lowering illegal Blood Alcohol 
Content limits to 0.5 mg/ml as a way to fight against road fatalities in Europe.  
 
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. Firstly, as far as I know, this is the first 
evaluation of BAC policies that uses international panel-based data for the former EU15 
countries. Secondly, this research aspire to fill another gap, since few studies evaluate the 
transition from higher BAC limits to the 0.5 mg/ml level.6 Finally, the most recent and 
                                                 
1 COM (97) 131. Promotion of road safety in the European Union 1997-2001.  
2 More than 41.000 lives were lost and 1.9 million were injured that year, some of them severely 
according to the Directorate-general for Energy and Transport of the European Commission. 
3 This estimation comes from the one million euros rule established in the European programme on road 
safety (1997), where it was agreed that one life had the social value of one million euros. 
4 A BAC level is the number of grams of ethanol per litre of blood. 
5 We call it imperfect process of homogenization because some countries never lowered that limit and 
still have an illegal BAC limit of 0.8 mg/ml. 
6 The literature was mainly focused in the American experience where several states lowered their illegal 
BAC levels to 0.8 mg/ml by the end of 1998. None of them established a lower limit. 
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technically accurate studies which used Differences-in-Differences in panel-based data to 
evaluate BAC changes – Dee (2001) and Eisenberg (2003) -, did not consider serial correlation 
problems. This absence can generate a downward bias in standard errors that could overestimate 
the effectiveness of lowering BAC levels. Therefore, the last contribution comes from solving 
this problem by taking into account not only the heterogeneity caused by dealing with different 
countries, but also the existence of serial correlation.  
 
Our main results show how lowering illegal BAC limits to 0.5 mg/ml has been an effective 
policy to save lives in particular road user groups in Europe. From these groups we can 
emphasize the case of males, to whom it has been especially effective in urban areas, and the 
case of all drivers between 20 and 49 years old. However, 0.5 mg/ml illegal BAC limits are not 
found statistically significant for the whole population unless it is accompanied by specific 
enforcement activities as random checks on the road. Moreover, I find an important time lag 
longer than two years in the effectiveness of the policy.  
 
This study is organised as follows. In section 2 I describe the evolution of the legislative process 
that leaded to the homogenisation in BAC limits, emphasizing the role taken by national and 
European institutions. In section 3 I introduce the related literature that has studied the 
effectiveness of setting and lowering BAC levels focusing our attention on the most recent and 
accurate studies that used panel-based data and Differences-in-Differences as a method of 
evaluation. In sections 4 and 5 I explain the methods, data and variables employed. In section 6 
I provide the main results while in section 7 I assert the importance of controling by serial 
correlation in the evaluation of this policy. Finally, some concluding remarks are reported in 
section 8. 
 
2. European and national legislations on BAC limits 
 
In Europe, the illegal Blood Alcohol Content (BAC) levels have always been established by 
national legislations. However, the European institutions have not remained impassive and their 
concern pushed the European Commission (EC) to propose a draft Directive in 1988 in order to 
harmonise illegal BAC limits at the level of 0.5 mg/ml in all member states.7 In that moment 
only Finland, Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden already had this limit in their national 
legislations. The Commission’s proposal was thought to send a clear and coherent message to 
                                                 
7 COM (88) 707. The Commission explains that this level was chosen after some studies and 
investigations and took into account the public acceptance that the new limit would have and the 
effectiveness of the reduction.  
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the drivers in the whole Community but did not succeed because several member states denied 
the competence of the European legislation.8 Although the Directive did not prosper, many 
member states having higher BAC limits decided to accommodate them to the level 
recommended during the following decade as I show in Table 1. Despite of this, thinking that 
their decision was only taken because of this frustrated Directive would be too naive, especially 
if we take into account that the first reforms were not undertaken until 1994. However, it is fair 
to consider the Commission’s proposal as the first important attempt to claim for a general 
reduction of BAC limits to the level of 0.5 mg/ml across Europe. 
 
Table 1. Changes Adopted in the Illegal BAC Limits. EU15 (1991-2003). 
 
Country Changes in illegal BAC limits 
during 1991-2003 
BAC limit (mg/ml) in 2006 
Austria January 1998 0.5 
Belgium December 1994 0.5 
Denmark March 1998 0.5 
France July 1994 / August 1995 0.5 
Finland - 0.5 
Germany April 1998 0.5 
Greece March 1999 0.5 
Luxembourg - 0.8 
Ireland April 1994 0.8  
Italy July 2002 0.5 
Netherlands - 0.5 
Portugal - 0.5 
Spain May 1999 0.5 
Sweden - 0.2 
United Kingdom - 0.8 
    Source: Self-construction. 
 
Belgium and France were the first two countries that decided to reduce their BAC limits to 0.5 
mg/ml in 1994 and 1995, respectively. Later, in April 1997, the EC launched a new programme 
to promote road safety which included the revival of the 1988 draft.9 Again, the programme 
claimed for a reduction in illegal BAC but the responsibility was left to the national 
legislation.10 This programme was more successful than the 1988 draft because five countries 
(Austria, Denmark, Germany, Spain and Greece) decided to join to the 0.5 mg/ml group during 
                                                 
8 This proposal was rejected by the Council of Transport Ministers in 1989 where the member states that 
were against the proposal (United Kingdom, Netherlands and Germany) claimed that there was no 
Community competence to act and no soundly justification.  
9 Promotion of road safety in the European Union 1997-2001. COM(97)131. 
10 Probably the Commission was aware of the opposition of some members to pass a Directive again. 
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the first two active years of the programme, making clear an important convergence towards a 
common prohibited BAC level. 
 
The last effort arrived in 2001 when, still in the last year of the same programme, the EC 
published a Recommendation that pursued the same objectives and included the reduction of 
illegal BAC limits as one of the most important measures to promote road safety. In that 
Recommendation the EC established the recommended BAC limit for the European Union in 
0.5 mg/ml.11 The EC asked to the countries that already had the recommended level to continue 
the tendency reducing this limit as low as possible. On the other hand, the Commission invited 
the rest of members to join at least to the group of 0.5 mg/ml. As a consequence, Italy was the 
only remaining member that reduced its illegal BAC limit after the Commission’s 
Recommendation while Ireland, Luxemburg and United Kingdom preferred to keep the 0.8 
mg/ml BAC limit.12  
 
As a result of the process above, 12 member states of the former EU15 have a permitted BAC 
level equal or lower than 0.5 mg/ml at the moment.13 Three countries already fulfilled this 
condition before 1991 and 8 changed their national legislation between that year and 2003 to 
enjoy the same situation.  
 
Finally, it is worth noting that besides of the European Commission’s activity and the national 
objectives, a regional peer expansion of policy enactment seems to have occurred if we focus 
our attention on the chronology reported in Table 1. Belgium and France lowered their limits 
between 1994 and 1996 to 0.5 mg/ml while Netherlands already had this limit. On the other 
hand, Austria, Germany and Denmark also homogenised their limits during the same year. 
Finally, the Mediterranean countries - Greece, Spain and Italy - have been the last group to 
reduce and set the common BAC limit since 1999.14 United Kingdom and Ireland never reduced 
their limits to the recommended one, while on the contrary, Sweden and Finland have kept a 
strict policy with low BAC limits for a long time before 1991. 
                                                 
11 European Comission’s Recommendation 2001. Official diary L 43 de 14.2.2001. 
12 Looking at Table 1, the reader can notice a change occurred in Ireland twelve years ago. Ireland had a 
higher illegal BAC level before 1994 and decided to lower it to the level of 0.8 mg/ml. Although there is 
some discussion in the country about the convenience of lowering it again, no decision has been 
undertaken yet.  
13 The unique country that established a lower BAC limit is Sweden who having already 0.5 mg/ml since 
1957, decided that was time to decrease it again to 0.2 mg/ml in 1990. Portugal also passed a reduction in 
2001 to force zero consumption but after one year they returned to the 0.5 mg/ml. level because of 
economic pressures and no significant effectiveness. 
14 Spain and Greece also lowered their illegal BAC limit within the same year 1999 to 0.5 mg/ml. 
Portugal and France already had this limit. 
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In conclusion, we have seen how the European countries have individually decided to 
harmonise their illegal BAC limit to 0.5 mg/ml using their national legislation but inspired by 
the European Commission’s activity. A peer effect based on regions seems to have been 
relevant as well. This process, which started in the middle of the last decade, is almost finished 
and only three countries remain out of it. 
 
3. Related literature 
 
The economic literature has been interested in road accidents for a long time. Recent studies 
usually attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of public policies and regulations against road 
fatalities. Mandatory seat belt devices, vehicle safety inspections or speed limits are some 
recurrent examples. However, we are interested in those policies and regulations aimed for 
reducing alcohol-related road fatalities. 
 
It is socially accepted that alcohol consumption is one of the main determinants of road crashes. 
Economic and medical literatures also support this idea. Levitt and Porter (1999), Moskowitz 
and Fiorentino (2000), Zador et al. (2000), Compton et al (2002) and Keall et al. (2004) are just 
some recent examples of scientific studies and medical reviews that prove the negative effects 
of alcohol consumption on driver’s skills. As a consequence, policies that were designed to fight 
against drunk driving have been of great relevance in the last two decades, becoming a favourite 
target for policy evaluators.  
 
Some researchers analysed several alcohol-related laws and facts. Baughman et al. (2001) and 
McCarthy (2003), for example, devoted their work to the importance of alcohol availability and 
alcohol access laws on road safety outputs. Saffer (1997) studied the role of alcohol advertising 
as a contributing factor of road fatalities while alcohol taxes have also been studied by Ruhm 
(1996) and Benson et al. (1999). Finally, Chaloupka and Saffer (1989) turned to breath testing 
as a deterrent instrument against drunk driving.  
 
Apart from the mentioned above, the Minimum Legal Drinking Age (MLDA) laws and the 
illegal BAC limits have been the two most treated regulations by the literature. The concern 
caused by the huge amount of alcohol-related accidents suffered by young drivers and recent 
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regulatory changes undertaken in USA could explain the particular relevance that these 
regulations recently enjoy.15  
 
The literature on the effectiveness of BAC changes has shown mixed results. As Eisenberg 
(2003) points out, this is not surprising because of the limitations and varying levels of accuracy 
carried out in those studies.16 Table 2 shows some of these interesting previous studies. Most of 
them based their analyses on weak research design, small samples, comparison problems and 
limited data, making impossible to get solid conclusions. Others present too short post-policy 
periods or do not control for simultaneous policies that can confound the real effectiveness of 
lowering illegal BAC levels. In addition, few studies tried to control for unobserved 
characteristics that can vary from one state to another by using a wide set of explanatory 
variables. However, it is not possible to capture all the heterogeneity by adding a large number 
of covariates. Therefore, none of them achieves a robust evaluation due to at least one of these 
briefly exposed problems. 
 
On the contrary, Dee (2001) and Eisenberg (2003) do not suffer the drawbacks above mentioned 
and represent, as far as I know, the most technically rigorous and accurate studies published so 
far. They use a large panel of annual state-level data covering the period 1982-2000 for USA 
federal states and introduce fixed effects to capture the unobserved heterogeneity.17 Moreover, 
several concurrent policies (Minimum legal drinking age, seatbelt laws, administrative license 
revocation, etc.) are introduced in the analyses to avoid confounding factors that could bias the 
estimates. Other time varying covariates like unemployment and vehicle-miles driven are also 
used. In both studies results seem to support the effectiveness of lowering illegal BAC levels to 
0.8 mg/ml in USA.18 Dee (2001), for instance, finds a reduction in the total fatality rate of 7.2% 
associated with the new illegal BAC level, while Eisenberg (2003) finds a reduction rate of 
3.1% in the fatal crash rate. In particular, the policy seems to be especially effective in the 
reduction of young fatalities, on weekends and during the night time. The last contribution 
offered by Eisenberg (2003) was the timing effects evaluation. He found an important delay of 6 
years in achieving that effectiveness that do not strictly contradict the main result but introduces 
some doubts about how the policy works. 
                                                 
15 Cook and Tauchen (1984), Asch and Levy (1990), DuMouchell et al. (1987),  Saffer and Grossman 
(1987), Wagenaar (1993) are just some interesting studies and reviews of the evaluation of changes in 
MLDA in USA. Results usually support the implementation of higher MLDA. 
16 See Fell and Voas (2003) for a literature review on the evidence of lowering BAC laws. 
17 Cook and Tauschen (1984) and Evans and Graham (1988), as far as we know, are probably the first 
studies that introduced fixed effects in the road safety literature. Ruhm (1996), for example, shows the 
goodness of this methology in the evaluation of road safety measures. 
18 They also find statistically effective the implementation of 1.0 BAC limits in places where no BAC 
legislation existed before. Eisenberg (2003) finds a higher effect associated with the 0.8 BAC level. 
CREAP2006-07 
 8
Despite of being the most relevant studies published so far from our point of view, Dee (2001) 
and Eisenberg (2003) did not take into account the possible serial correlation that can arise 
using Differences-in-Differences methods with a large panel and a highly time correlated 
dependent variable. For that reason, their estimates could be downwards biased, as it is 
explained in Bertrand et al. (2004), overestimating the effectiveness of the policy. Later in this 
research I try to solve this drawback by allowing for any pattern of correlation. 
 
All studies described above are focused on the reduction of illegal BAC limits to the level of 0.8 
mg/ml. This study attempts to evaluate the next step: the transition to 0.5 mg/ml%. 
Unfortunately, the literature on 0.5 BAC limits is much more scarcer. Basically, a major part of 
these works are just national or regional reports that support the reduction of illegal BAC limits 
by comparing pre-post statistical data. Other scientific studies just present the same technical 
limitations mentioned before in the description of the 0.8 literature. From this group of 0.5 BAC 
studies I can mention Henstridge et al. (1997) for Australia, Bartl and Esberger (2000) for 
Austria, Bernhoft (2003) for Denmark, Mercier-Guyon (1998) in the case of France, and finally 
Noordzij (1994) for Netherlands. None of these works uses an international European panel to 
study this transition, meaning that the current research can fill another relevant space in the 
evaluation of such an interesting policy. 
 
To conclude this section, I want to highlight the main contributions of this study to the 
literature, which is twofold: first, this research is the first one to estimate the effect of lowering 
illegal BAC limits in Europe using panel-based data from former EU15 countries and fixed 
effects; and second, it is the first one that takes into account serial correlation in estimating the 
effect of changes in illegal BAC limits, avoiding the usual overestimation suffered by previous 
works.19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19  However, this is not the first study that controls for serial correlation in the road safety literature. Dee 
and Sela (2003) was, as far as we know, the first study that started this estimation strategy in evaluating 
speed limit changes in USA. 
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Table 2. Previous Literature on 0.8 BAC Limits Evaluation. 
 
Study Location Results 
NHTSA (1991) State of California (USA) 12% decline in alcohol related fatalities 
NHTSA (1994) Five States (USA) Significant reductions in alcohol involvement 
Johnson and 
 Fell (1995) 
Five States (USA) Significant reductions in alcohol-related 
 fatal crashes in 4 states 
Rogers (1995)  State of California (USA) Mixed Results 
OTS (1995) State of California (USA) Mixed results 
Hingson et al. (1996) Five States (USA) Reduction in alcohol involvement 
Foss et al. (1998)  State of North Carolin (USA) No clear effects 
Apsler et al. (1999) 11 States (USA) Significant reduction in alcohol  
involvement only in two states 
Hingson et al. (2000) Six States (USA) 6% decline in alcohol-related fatal crashes 
Voas et al. (2000) 50 States and District of 
Columbia (USA) 
Decrease in the alcohol involvement  
Shults et al. (2001) 50 States (USA)  7% reduction in measures of alcohol-related  
Dee (2001) 48 States (USA) 7.2% decline in the total fatality rate 
Eisenberg (2003) 50 States and District of 
Columbia (USA) 
3.1% reduction in fatal crash rate 
Source: Table adapted from Fell and Voas (2003). NHTS: National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration (USA).  
 
4. Empirical strategy 
 
This study uses several fatality rates for the former EU15 countries for the period 1991-2003 to 
evaluate the impact of the reduction of illegal BAC limits that some countries undertook during 
that time interval. The method chosen is a slight extension of the Differences-in-Differences 
estimation procedure specified as a two way fixed effects model that takes the following form: 
 
Yst = Xst β + δ Zst + ws + vt + εst     (1) 
 
where Yst is the chosen dependent variable (Fatality rate), Xst contains the vector of time-varying 
control covariates and Zst is the policy dummy variable that I am evaluating. As usual, ws and vt 
are state-specific and year-specific fixed effects and εst is a mean-zero random error. State fixed 
effects control for time-invariant state-specific omitted variables and year dummies control for 
national trends. The key element of this Difference-in-Difference model is the parameter δ 
which measures the difference between the average change in the fatality rates of the treatment 
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group (countries that have a BAC level of 0.5 mg/ml or lower at some point during the period 
studied) and the average change in the fatality rates of the control group (those countries that 
kept a higher BAC level).  
 
Specifically, 
 
δ = [ E(YA / G = 1) – E(YB / G = 1)] - [ E(YA / G = 0) – E(YB / G = 0)]   (2) 
 
where YB and YA denote the road fatality rate before and after the reform and G = 1 and G = 0 
denote treatment and control group observations, respectively.  
 
One of the most basic assumptions of Differences-in-Differences models is that the temporal 
effect in the two groups of states is the same in the absence of intervention. This is called the 
fundamental identifying assumption and it is described as the equality between average changes 
in the two groups in the absence of intervention. As Galiani, Gertler and Schargrosdky (2005), I 
test for the equality between average changes in the two groups in the pre-treatment period to 
assess the plausibility of the fundamental identifying assumption. This kind of tests are as 
important as forgotten in the Differences-in-Differences applied literature.  
 
The strategy consists on considering only the pre-treatment years from each treated country, 
excluding observations from treated years. In addition, I add the observations from each control 
country for the whole period.20 Once I have the observations of interest I estimate equation (1) 
but now with two important changes. First, I use separate time dummies for treatment and 
control countries because it allows us to check whether the time trends in the pre-treatment 
period were the same; and second, I drop out the policy dummy variable.  
 
The results of the test tell us that we cannot statistically reject the hypothesis of having the same 
time trends in the pre-treatment period for control and treatment groups, and according to 
Heckman and Hotz (1989), this validates the main Differences-in-Differences identifying 
assumption. Results of this test can be found in the appendix (A1). 
 
Another concern in using Differences-in-Differences to evaluate the impact of any policy across 
heterogeneous individuals is to make sure that I do not have endogeneity problems that biases 
the policy effects. Bertrand et al. (2004) points out that Differences-in-Differences models can 
                                                 
20 We can use the whole period for the control countries because some countries that still keep high BAC 
limits (United Kingdom, Ireland and Luxembourg) never changed the law during the period considered.  
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avoid many of these endogeneity problems but they can still be one important limitation. As 
Besley and Case (2000) states, policy change is purposeful action and can rarely be treated as 
experimental data. Therefore, further research is needed to understand what drives policy 
makers in each case of study.  
 
In our case I cannot test a policy equation but I can try to find whether any pattern on the 
evolution of fatality rates and the decision of lowering BAC levels exists. One could reasonably 
think that those countries who undertook the policy might have observed a bad shock in 
fatalities in their recent past.  
 
The rates of variation constructed taking into account the last pre-treatment years for each 
treated country and reported in Table 3, reveal that we cannot clearly identify this pattern. 
Actually, only few countries passed new illegal BAC levels after suffering positive rates of 
variation in the last pre-treatment years. However, it is true that the rate of change observed for 
the last pre-treatment year is slightly lower than the annual average change since 1991 for most 
of the countries.  In spite of this, all countries except Spain and Greece, show good results for 
the last two years, making unlikely that governments considered what happened in the latest 
period an important trend change. Moreover, only Austria and Spain suffered a really important 
growth in the fatality rate in the last pre-treatment year. For these reasons seems too strict to 
believe that BAC limits were lowered generally because of bad shocks in the short past. 
 
Table 3. Rates of Change in the Fatality Rate Before the 0.5 BAC Limit Enactment 
(Treated Countries). 
 
Country 
 
Change Last 
Year1 
Change Last Two 
Years2 
Annual Average 
 Change since 19913 
Austria 7% -9% -6% 
Belgium -1% -12% -6% 
Denmark -5% -17% -4% 
Germany -3% -10% -5% 
Greece 3% 1% 0% 
Spain 6% 8% -5% 
France -2% -10% -5% 
Italy 0% 5% -2% 
 1. Change in the fatality rate suffered in the last year before setting the 0.5 BAC limit. 
 2. Change in the fatality rate observed in the last two years before setting the 0.5 BAC limit. 
 3. Average rate of variation in the fatality rate since 1991 until the enactment year. 
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Other two possible explanations are the peer effect expansion and the role of the European 
Union in its fight against road fatalities. The detailed description of the legal chronology 
exposed in the previous section show how regions seem to have relevance in the enactment 
process of illegal BAC limits. At the same time, we cannot forget the implication of the 
European Commission and the programme launched to promote road safety in 1997, which 
recommended the 0.5 BAC limit and was followed by several countries. Both explanations did 
not represent any endogeneity problem and cannot promote misleading conclusions. 
 
In the last effort to overcome the endogeneity concern, I follow the strategy of Eisenberg (2003) 
and check the time pattern of policy effects with respect to the date of adoption. Our goal is to 
address unobserved factors like attitude shifts that can be partly responsible for the enactment of 
stricter policies. This test consists on the same basic model (1) introduced earlier but now using 
binary variables related to the time distance respect to the adoption year instead of the policy 
dummy. Results of the test can be found in the appendix (A2) and they tell us that no significant 
time patterns are found before the enactment.  
 
Finally, Bertrand et al. (2004) find that most papers that employ Differences-in-Differences 
estimation ignore serial correlation problems even when they use many years of data and 
dependent variables likely to be serially correlated.21 We cannot forget that the estimated effect 
of the policy is the common OLS estimate. This generates standard errors that severely 
understate the standard deviation of Differences-in-Differences estimator in the presence of 
serial correlation. In order to correct this bias Bertrand et al. (2004) propose different solutions 
that apply depending on sample characteristics. Given the number of states I have in this study 
the method that performs better according with their Montecarlo simulations is allowing for an 
arbitrary variance-covariance matrix.22 For that reason, the results exposed below take into 
account not only heteroskedasticity but also serial correlation within states, and this represents 
one important difference between this study and the most advanced literature focused in the 
evaluation of BAC laws.23 As it is well known, this method is based on the estimation of the 
variance-covariance matrix allowing for all arbitrary of correlation.  
 
 
 
                                                 
21 Three causing factors are found in Bertrand et al. (2004): Long time series, serial correlated dependent 
variables and a treatment variable that changes itself very little within a state over time.  
22 See Bertrand et al. (2004) to check a summary of  their Montecarlo simulations for different number of 
states. 
23 The same strategy is used by Dee and Sela (2003) in the evaluation of changes in speed limits as we 
mentioned in note 15.  
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The estimator used takes the following form: 
                    
    V = (X’X)-1 (∑
=
N
i 1
ui’ui) (X`X)-1              (3) 
ui = ∑
=
T
t 1
eit xit 
 
where V represents the variance-covariance estimator, X the matrix of independent variables and 
N the number of groups (states). On the other hand, eit is the state-year specific residual and xit 
the vector of independent variables.24, 25 
 
5. Data and variables employed 
 
This research is based on the European database CARE (Community database on Accidents on 
the Roads in Europe), which started collecting data in 1993 and provides information on annual 
road casualties reported by the countries that form the EU25.26 The Council created this 
Community database on road safety outputs (Fatality Rates, Total Fatalities, Total Injuries, etc.) 
in order to make possible to identify and quantify road safety problems in the continent.27 Thus, 
CARE contains state-level data since 1991 until 2004 for the EU25. However, we are interested 
in the homogenisation in illegal BAC limits occurred during the last decade, just before the EU 
enlargement. For that reason I use only data related to the former EU15 countries. In addition, I 
only use data up to 2003 because the rest of variables are not always available for that last year. 
As a consequence, I have a sample based on 15 countries during 13 years for the Total Fatality 
Rates (195 observations).  
 
The best characteristic of this database is that CARE allows exploiting its high level of 
disaggregation, making possible the use of different fatality rates depending on several victim 
groups. The available groups are divided by gender, age, zone and kind of road user. 
Unfortunately, for some reason CARE does not contain disaggregated data for Germany. 
Therefore, I use 14 countries in the analysis of disaggregated dependent variables (182 
observations).  
                                                 
24 In fact, this is known as the White-like formula to compute standard errors  (White, 1984). Also see 
Arellano (1987) for a deeper understanding. 
25 Since this method is only valid assimptotcally, we apply the finite sample adjustment used by STATA: 
N-1/(N-k) * M/(M-1), where N is the number of observations, k the number of regressors including the 
constant and M the number of clusters.  
26 This database can be consulted on-line http://ec.europa.eu/transport/roadsafety. 
27 Council Decision 93/704/EC. 
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The rest of variables are found in international databases like Eurostat, WHO Europe, World 
Bank Development Indicators and the World Road Statistics. The policy variables used are 
found in national and European reports. In Table 4 I show the explanatory variables used in this 
research and their descriptive statistics for the whole sample.  
 
Several dependent variables are used depending on the age group and gender of the victims, and 
on the areas where they were killed. These dependent variables are just the fatality rates per 
100.000 inhabitants of each population group or the fatality rate per 100.000 Km driven.28 
Unfortunately, CARE does not contain the latter. To cover this lack and compare both rates, at 
least for the aggregated rates, I use data available in the WHO database for Europe.29  
                                                 
28 According to Eisenberg (2003), the literature traditionally uses as output measures these fatality rates 
because of their accuracy and relevance for policy makers. 
29 World Health Organization Regional Office for Europe (HFA-DB Database). 
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Table 4. Explanatory Variables. Definitions and Descriptive Statistics 
 
Explanatory 
variables Description Mean S.D. 
Unemployment  
Rate Unemployment Rate in %. 8.748 4.296 
Growth Rate Rate of change (%) of the Real GDP,  PPP$ per capita. 2.750 2.617 
Motorization Number of passenger cars per 1000 inhabitants. 418.536 93.768 
Vehicle-Km 
driven 
Annual number passenger cars-Km expressed  
in 1000 million km and weighted by the national 
population. 
9.146 2.452 
Upper secondary 
Education 
% Population between 16-64 years-old  
with upper secondary education. 55.911 18.270 
Motorways Proportion in % of Motorways (km) over the  total road network. 1.312 0.935 
National Roads Proportion in % of National Roads (km) over the  total road network. 8.942 5.105 
Minimum Legal 
Drinking Age 
Binary variable: 1 for purpose and non-purpose 
minimum legal drinking age for all beverages.  
0 Otherwise. 
0.592 0.491 
Points License 
Binary variable: 1 for countries with driving  
license that depends on a system based on points. 
 0 Otherwise. 
0.174 0.377 
Random Checks 
Binary variable: 1 for countries that allow the 
realization of random breath or Blood tests on the 
road. 0 Otherwise. 
0.779 0.416 
BAC05 
Binary variable: 1 Countries with an illegal BAC 
limit of  0.5 mg/ml or lower. 0 for higher illegal 
BAC limits. 
0.504 0.495 
BAC05 +    
Random Checks 
Binary variable: 1 for countries that allow random 
checks and keep an illegal BAC level of  
0.5 mg/ml. 0 Otherwise. 
0.496 0.497 
 
Before describing the control variables it is worth noting that including a large list of 
socioeconomic covariates avoids confounding factors that can bias the impact of the policy by 
keeping them constant and can also give us a better understanding of which factors may 
influence road fatalities in Europe.  
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In Ruhm (1996) we saw that macroeconomic variables can help us to improve our estimation 
because road fatalities and alcohol consumption are usually prociclycal.30 For that reason I 
include unemployment and economic growth rates to account for economic cycle.  
 
Besides of macroeconomic variables, I also add some covariates more related with 
transportation and the use of vehicles. These variables are Motorization and Vehicle-Km. I also 
include infrastructure variables to catch the possible effect that quality and road characteristics 
can have on driving. These variables are Motorways and National Roads (% of the total 
network) and are not usually included in the literature. The educational background of the 
population between 15 and 64 years old is also taken into account as an additional 
socioeconomic covariate. 
 
The regulatory binary variables form the last group of covariates. Ruhm (1996), Dee (2001) and 
Eisenberg (2003) show that it is important to introduce different laws related with road fatalities 
to avoid confounding effects that may arise in the evaluation of a particular policy if other legal 
reforms were undertaken simultaneously. For that reason the Minimum Legal Drinking Age 
(MLDA) and the Points License are introduced as potentially simultaneous policies. The first 
one takes value 1 for states in years when they have a clear Minimum Legal Drinking Age for 
purpose and non-purpose drinking and for all alcoholic beverages, and 0 otherwise. The second 
one takes value one in state-years in which this system of driving license based on points is in 
effect and 0 otherwise. Although I could use other potentially relevant policies, it is important to 
preserve degrees of freedom. The choice of these two policies is arbitrary but follows the 
criteria of being comparable across states, manageable given the differences across national 
legislations, and the presence of within group variation in some countries for the period studied. 
Additionally, I avoid those policies that the literature agreed to have no impact on road fatalities 
or present mixed results. The use of Points License as a concurrent policy variable is especially 
interesting because it is mainly an European policy that has been recently undertaken in some 
countries and has not been deeply studied so far.  
 
Finally, the expected key policy variable that serves to evaluate the effectiveness of lowering 
Blood Alcohol Content legal limits is named BAC0.5. This variable takes value 1 in states and 
years when a country has an illegal BAC limit of 0.5 mg/ml or lower, and 0 when this limit is 
higher.31 A fractional correction is applied for cases in which the policy was implemented at 
                                                 
30 See Evans and Graham (1988) and Ruhm (1995) for a deeper discussion on these relationships. 
31 It is important to point out that Sweden, for example, has a 0.2 mg/ml BAC limit for the whole time 
series and Portugal presents the same BAC limit in 2001. These facts justifies why we control for BAC 
levels of 0.5 mg/ml or lower. 
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some point during the year. Moreover, Dee (2001) explains that it is not only important to 
control by the policy of evaluation, but also by the level of enforcement that exists. For this 
purpose I use the variable Random Checks to control for the enforcement of this policy. 
Random Checks identifies countries that authorise and undertake random breath tests on the 
road. In addition, I also create a new explanatory binary variable that is formed by the 
interaction between lowered BAC limits and random checks to capture whether there is a 
different impact when the policy is accompanied or not by this reasonable enforcement 
activity.32 
 
6. Main results 
 
The estimation results for the total fatality rates are reported in Table 5. Specifications (1) and 
(2) show that the coefficients associated with the 0.5 mg/ml BAC limit are not significant 
neither for the total fatality rate per population nor for the total fatality rate per Km driven. On 
the contrary, when I use as a key policy variable the interaction between BAC limits and 
Random Checks in models (3) and (4) I find an important negative impact even at the 5% level 
of significance in the latter model. This result suggests that lowering BAC levels does not have 
a global impact unless this regulation is enforced in practice by random checks on the road. 
Thus, when these two regulatory measures go together both fatality rates seem to decline 
substantially. The fatality rate on population declines a 4.3% while the fatality rate on km driven 
falls a 6.1%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
32 Alcohol consumption is not included even knowing its strong impact on road fatalities, because it is 
directly affected by the regulation I am evaluating. In this direction I discuss later that the success of 
lowering BAC levels could apply mainly due to the effect that this change have on alcohol consumption 
in treated states. 
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Table 5. Least-squares Estimates for Semi-logs Models. Total Fatality Rates. 
 
 
Independent 
variables 
TFR 
per 100.000 
Population 
(1) 
TFR 
per 100.000  
Km driven 
(2) 
TFR 
per 100.000 
Population 
(3) 
TFR 
 per 100.000  
Km driven 
(4) 
 
BAC0.5 
 
-0.0339  
  (0.0271) 
 
-0.0429   
(0.0338) 
- - 
 
Random Checks 
 
-0.0040    
(0.0758) 
 
0.0861    
(0.0731) 
- - 
 
BAC0.5 + 
Random Checks 
 
- 
 
- 
 
-0.0426*   
 (0.0228) 
 
-0.0612**  
  (0.0220) 
 
Points License 
 
0.00556    
(0.0411) 
 
-0.0618   
 (0.0533) 
 
0.0072   
(0.0402) 
 
-0.0612   
 (0.0503) 
 
MLDA 
 
-0.0121   
(0.0215) 
 
0.0059   
 (0.0235) 
 
-0.0102    
(0.0197) 
 
0.0064   
 (0.0197) 
 
Unemployment rate 
 
-0.0032    
(0.0030) 
 
0.0009   
 (0.0039) 
 
-0.0032   
 (0.0032) 
 
0.0009   
 (0.0044) 
 
Growth rate 
 
0.0091*   
 (0.0049) 
 
0.0064  
  (0.0059) 
 
0.0093*    
(0.0046) 
 
0.0057   
 (0.0054) 
 
Motorization 
 
-0.0019**   
 (0.0006) 
 
-0.0040***   
 (0.0003) 
 
-0.0019***  
 (0.0006) 
 
-0.0041***   
(0.0003) 
 
Vehicle-Km 
 
0.0381   
(0.0436) 
 
- 
 
0.0381    
(0.0433) 
 
- 
 
 Upper Sec. 
Education 
 
0.0046   
(0.0030) 
 
0.0065*   
 (0.0036) 
 
0.0045*    
 (0.0024) 
 
0.0072**   
 (0.0032) 
 
Motorways 
 
-0.0478***    
(0.0103) 
 
-0.0464***   
 (0.0124) 
 
-0.0455***    
(0.0099) 
 
-0.0372***   
(0.0109) 
 
National Roads 
 
0.0033   
 (0.0023) 
 
0.0040*  
 (0.0021) 
 
0.0032 
   (0.0022) 
 
0.0032*    
(0.0017) 
 
R-sq 
 
0.81 
 
0.93 
 
0.80 
 
0.93 
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis allowing for clustering by country. Each model also includes 
time and state fixed  effects and  a constant term.* Statistically significant at the 10% level; ** at  
5% level and *** at 1% level. 
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Macroeconomic variables do not seem to have a strong role on road fatalities in Europe. Only 
growth rates seem to have an impact on fatality rates on specifications (1) and (3). Thus, I 
cannot reject the procyclical effect of road fatalities but it seems to be weaker than expected. 
 
On the other hand, the coefficient associated with the country motorization is highly significant 
in all specifications. It is worth noting that the negative sign it shows can be explained by the 
level of transport development achieved by the country. There is an important negative 
correlation between development and accidents, since more developed countries usually enjoy 
better infrastructures, safer cars, more organised regulations and more police interventions. 
Thus, the number of cars per 1000 inhabitants may be considered as a proxy for the achieved 
transport development.  
 
Interesting results are obtained regarding the road infrastructure variables. The coefficient 
associated with Motorways, the best type of road and therefore the safest, is always strongly 
significant across specifications and presents negative sign. Moreover, National Roads, that are 
roads of a lower quality than motorways but where users drive still fast, presents positive sign 
and significant coefficient in models (2) and (4). This result suggests that road system’s quality 
and characteristics play a relevant role as well. 
 
Finally, the upper secondary education variable is significant in all models except in 
specification (1) and has positive impact. One possible explanation is that more educated people 
usually travel more often and enjoy more leisure. This would act as a proxy of income, variable 
that the literature usually finds positive related with accidents because of the positive correlation 
that exists between income and both alcohol consumption and vehicle use.  
 
Recent works on road fatalities as Eisenberg (2003), Dee and Sela (2003) and Grabowsky and 
Morrisey (2004), have studied the impact of road safety measures on different victim groups. I 
also follow this strategy dividing fatalities into age and gender groups. In addition CARE also 
allows to include the difference between urban and non-urban fatalities to check where the 
policy has been more effective. Table 6 shows the results of applying specifications (1) and (3) 
to each age group. Lowering BAC limits seems to be effective for people between 20 and 49 
years old. A reduction around 10.5% is found in victims between 20-40 years old and a decline 
of 8% for the 40-50 age group. Older groups do not seem to be affected by the change in the 
policy.  
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Table 6. Least-squares Estimates for Semi-logs Models. Age Group Fatality Rates. 
(Selected Results) 
 
 
Independent 
variables 
Age Group 
20-29 
(5) 
Age Group 
30-39 
(6) 
Age Group 
40-49 
(7) 
Age Group 
50-59 
(8) 
 
BAC0.5 
 
  -0.1050*   
 (0.0515) 
 
  -0.1043**    
(0.0400) 
 
  -0.0819*  
  (0.0422) 
 
 
-0.0965    
 (0.0656) 
 
 
BAC0.5 + 
Random Checks 
 
     -0.0992*  
  (0.052) 
 
 
-0.1077**  
  (0.0396) 
 
-0.0823* 
  (0.0417) 
 
-0.0862 
 (0.0620) 
     
 
Independent 
variables 
Age Group 
60-69 
(9) 
Age Group 
70-79 
(10) 
Age Group 
+70 
(11) 
Age Group 
+ 80 
(12) 
 
BAC0.5 
 
0.0153    
(0.0638) 
 
0.0378 
(0.035) 
 
-0.0767    
(0.0968) 
 
-0.0068   
 (0.0842) 
 
BAC0.5 + 
Random Checks 
 
0.0170  
 (0.0651) 
 
 
0.0424   
 (0.0332) 
 
-0.0680    
 (0.0829) 
 
0.0075    
(0.0877) 
Each model include the rest of explanatory variables, time and state dummy variables and a constant 
term. Standard errors allowing for clustering by country are reported in parenthesis 
 
In Table 7 I show the results for gender groups and zones.33 Males seem to be the gender group 
affected by the policy causing a decrease of 5.7% in their fatality rate. On the contrary, the 
policy seems to have no impact on female fatalities, may be because their law fulfilment was 
already higher. 
 
Once we introduce the area where the accident happened I do not find any difference until I put 
together gender and zone. Once they joined I observe only one affected group by the policy: 
Males in urban areas. The reduction estimated is 9.5 or 10.9%, depending on the BAC variable 
used as it is shown in Table 7. However, no impact is found in non-urban zones. This result 
could be explained by the fact that non-urban fatalities can be caused by other problems more 
related with speed, sleepery and road characteristics. These factors are more likely to be the 
most relevant in non-urban than in urban driving where the speed is not usually so high and the 
characteristics of roads are more homogeneous.  
                                                 
33 Models (1) and (3) are also applied here but Motorways and national roads are dropped out when we 
study urban fatalities. 
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Table 7. Least-squares Estimates for Semi-logs Models. 
Gender and Zone Fatality Rates. (Selected results) 
 
Each model include the rest of explanatory variables, time and state dummy variables and a constant 
term. Standard errors allowing for clustering by country are reported in parenthesis. The variable 
Motorways is excluded in the models that treat  urban road fatalities. 
 
Finally, I tried a new combination joining age groups and zone but, as it is shown in the 
appendix (A3 and A4), no stable results are found with the exception of young groups in urban 
zones where I find an important effect of the policy. In Table 8 I report results for the young 
group by zone. 
 
After identifying the affected groups, I am interested in the evaluation of timing effects. 
Eisenberg (2003) introduced this analysis in this literature and found an important lag of at least 
6 years. In our case I replicate the strategy using binary time variables instead of the 0.5 BAC 
policy. These new dummies are constructed as time intervals that account for the time after the 
new legislation was adopted. Because of data constraints I construct 2 intervals. The first one, 
that takes value one in state-years from 0 to 2 years after the enactment and zero otherwise, is 
thought to identify short time effects. The second, that takes value one from the third year of 
 
Independent 
Variables 
Male 
Total Fatalities 
(13) 
Female 
Total Fatalities 
(14) 
Non-Urban  
Total Fatalities 
(15) 
Urban 
Total Fatalities 
(16) 
 
BAC0.5 
 
 
-0.0573*  
 (0.0317) 
 
 
-0.0250 
(0.0407) 
 
-0.0362 
(0.0573) 
 
-0.0470   
(0.0413) 
 
BAC0.5 + 
Random Checks 
 
 
-.0574*   
 (0.0313) 
 
-0.0232    
(0.0394) 
 
-0.0310   
 (0.0425) 
 
-0.0678  
 (0.0405) 
     
 
Independent 
variables 
Male 
Non-Urban  
Fatalities 
(17) 
Male 
Urban 
Fatalities 
(18) 
Female 
Non-Urban  
Fatalities 
(19) 
Female 
Urban  
Fatalities 
(20) 
 
BAC0.5 
 
 
-0.0470 
(0.0361) 
 
-.0959**    
(0.0419) 
 
 
-0.0362   
 (0.0573) 
 
-0.0205   
 (0.0603) 
 
BAC0.5 + 
Random Checks 
 
 
-0.0351   
(0.0402) 
 
-0.1094** 
(0.0463) 
 
-0.0240    
(0.0601) 
 
-0.0240    
(0.0601) 
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application and zero otherwise, captures long term effects. Thus, I apply it only to the models 
where the 0.5 BAC policy was effective in the previous estimations. 
 
Table 8. Least-squares Estimates for Semi-logs Models. 
Age 20-29 Group and Zone Fatality Rates. (Selected results) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                           
Two-way fixed effects estimation. The model includes a constant term and the 
rest of covariates used in previous specifications with the exception of infrastructure 
            variables in the case of urban fatality rate. Cluster-robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
 
Results reported in Table 9 seem to suggest that lowering BAC levels is not generally effective 
in the short-run. What I find is that it is necessary to wait more than two years to observe some 
impact. Only for males in urban areas a short time effect is found, but the coefficient in the long 
term interval is significantly higher as well. Although I find a significant delay, our result seem 
to be less surprising than the 6 years delay obtained by Eisenberg (2003). However, I must 
honestly point out that this result only implies that the effectiveness of the policy could start in 
the third year but nothing can make sure that the effects do not start later due to the time 
intervals I have used. 
 
To sum up, we have seen that lowering illegal BAC limits has been an effective policy for the 
whole population when it is accompanied by random checks on the road. Moreover, in 
disaggregated cases, we have checked that males and young road users, especially in urban 
zones, are clearly affected by the policy. The rest of drivers from 30 to 49 years old also receive 
the positive impact of lowering BAC levels. However, the effectiveness of the policy do not 
usually apply in the short run. The rest of victim groups do not seem to receive any benefit from 
the policy. 
 
 
 
 
 
Independent 
Variables 
Urban  
Age 20-29 
(21) 
Non-Urban  
Age 20-29 
(25) 
 
BAC0.5 
 
 
    -0.2830**    
 (0.0972) 
 
-0.0341     
 (0.0561) 
 
BAC0.5 + 
Random Checks 
 
 
    -0.2947**   
 (0.1031) 
 
-0.0341     
(0.0561) 
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7. Serial correlation treatment 
 
In section 5 I argued that scorning serial correlation can lead sometimes to too optimistic 
estimates on the effectiveness of the policy using Differences-in-Differences methods. For that 
reason in this section I provide some evidence of this by finding the results I would have 
obtained forgetting serial correlation and basing our estimation only on heteroskedastic-
consistent standard errors like previous studies.  
 
Table 10 presents the results of this estimation that serves to compare with Table 5. Now, BAC 
reductions would have appeared effective even in countries without random checks on the road 
while we have seen that only when the policy is accompanied by random checks it is actually 
effective. In addition, the coefficient associated with the low BAC policy becomes more 
significant, also in those estimations that use the interacted variable that identifies policy and 
enforcement at the same time (BAC05+Random Checks). The rest of variables do not change 
very sharply.  
 
When the same strategy is applied to the rest of fatality rates, the ones that appeared affected in 
section 6 show now even more statistically significant coefficients associated to the BAC 
policy. However, only urban fatalities changes from not being impacted to being impacted, 
while I have shown that only males receive the benefits of the policy in these zones. The rest of 
rates of fatality does not change and provide the same interpretations found in section 6. 
 
These examples make clear the importance of controlling for serial correlation to avoid 
misleading interpretations in the evaluation of public policies under Differences-in-Differences 
in large panels. In our case of study, few mistakes would be inspired by scorning serial 
correlation but enough to confound some effects.  
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Table 10. Least-squares Estimates for Semi-logs Models for Total Fatality Rates. 
White-Robust Estimation. (Selected results) 
 
Independent 
variables 
TFR 
 per 100.000  
Population 
(29) 
TFR 
 per 100.000  
Km driven 
(30) 
TFR 
per 100.000 
Population 
(31) 
 
TFR 
per 100.000  
Km driven 
(32) 
 
 
BAC0.5 
 
   -0.0339*  
  (0.0271) 
 
  -0.0429*  
 (0.0338) 
- - 
 
Random Checks 
 
-0.0040    
 (0.0758) 
 
0.0861    
(0.0731) 
- - 
 
BAC0.5 + 
Random Checks 
 
- 
 
- 
 
  -0.0426**    
(0.0228) 
 
   -0.0612***   
(0.0220) 
 
R-sq 
 
0.81 
 
0.93 
 
0.81 
 
0.93 
   Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Each model also includes  
   time and state fixed effects, the rest of covariates and the constant term. 
 
8. Concluding remarks 
 
Lowering illegal BAC levels to 0.5 mg/ml has been an effective policy in Europe. However, I 
cannot leave this conclusion without further discussion. As I have shown, the policy is not 
found effective for all road users unless some enforcement is present in the country, stressing its 
importance in any policy or regulatory change. Moreover, the effectiveness of the policy is 
heterogeneous depending on the age, gender and zone of the victim group. Therefore, this can 
give some advice to policy-makers to understand which groups are more likely to be affected by 
this and other policies related with drunk driving. However, we have seen that it is usually 
necessary to wait more than two years in order to obtain the positive influence of the policy, 
ruling out a short-run effect. Further research is needed to understand this time lag.34  
 
It is also important to point out that although I find positive effects in the enactment of the 
policy, a cost-benefit analysis is absolutely necessary to conclude whether this policy can be 
recommended from an economic point of view. We can not forget that changing the behaviour 
of people in this case can generate a negative impact on several sectors (alcoholic beverages 
industry, bars and restaurants, discotheques, etc.).35 Thus, we should make sure that predicted 
                                                 
34 See Eisenberg (2003). 
35 This negative impact can be translated in a lower alcohol consumption and therefore in lower income 
and probable employment losses. 
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costs do not exceed the economic benefits obtained by the policy before recommending this tool 
to the countries that still keep higher illegal BAC limits in Europe. This analysis is left for 
future research.  
 
We have seen the importance of allowing for any pattern of correlation in this kind of estimation 
to avoid possible misleading interpretations that could affect the degree of effectiveness derived 
from the analysis. For that reason, I give strong arguments and some evidence to come under 
review the estimates found by the previous literature on BAC policies.36 Overcoming this 
problem in this research adds another interesting contribution to the literature.  
  
Finally, I consider that a preliminary debate on the pathways used by the policy against drunk 
driving needs to be launched. Behind this research, there was the assumption that lowering BAC 
levels could reduce drunk driving through discouraging alcohol consumption.37 However, this 
might not be the only possible pathway covered by the policy against drunk driving. Another 
reasonable consequence could imply the reduction of Km travelled. This pathway could arise 
through an increase of public transport use or by changing leisure habits (less journeys, more 
home meetings, walking distances, etc.). In the appendix (A5) I present a preliminary test that 
seems to support that people reduce their alcohol consumption when this policy comes into 
force. However, these preliminary results are not conclusive and consequently more robust 
analyses are needed to achieve a confirmation. 
                                                 
36 As far as we know Dee and Sela (2003) were the first authors using Differences-in-Differences to 
consider serial correlation in their evaluation of the effectiveness of changing speed limits in USA. 
37 That is the reason why we did not include alcohol consumption as an explanatory variable in the basic 
model used to evaluate the effectiveness of BAC policies. 
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Appendix  
 
A1.a.  Identifying  Assumption Test. Estimation Results. 
 
                                   Robust 
  ln Rate fat.      Coef.    Std. Err.        t    P>|t| 
 Random checks  0.0143  .0888  0.16     0.874  
 Mlda   0.0126  .0332   -0.38   0.709  
 Points License  0.0159  .04312  0.37     0.717      
 Unemployment  -0.0045 .0034  -1.35     0.199     
 Growth rate  0.0090  .0062  1.44     0.172     
 Motorization  0.0021  .0008  -2.70     0.017     
 Vehicle-Km  0.0341  .0437  0.78     0.447    
 Education  0.0066  .0029  2.26     0.040      
 Motorways  -0.0521 .0129  -4.03     0.001 
 National Roads  0.0046  .0030  1.53     0.148     
yeartreated~1991   0.3544  .0632  5.61     0.000      
yearcontrol~1991   0.1585  .1783  0.89     0.389      
yeartreated~1992   0.2957  .0496  5.97     0.000      
yearcontrol~1992   0.1847  .1563  1.18     0.257     
yeartreated~1993   0.2662   .0598  4.45     0.001      
yearcontrol~1993   0.1229  .1372  0.90     0.386     
yeartreated~1994   0.1853   .0482  3.84     0.002      
yearcontrol~1994   0.0522  .1159  0.45     0.659     
yeartreated~1995   0.1868  .0637  2.93     0.011      
yearcontrol~1995   0.0891   .0755  1.18     0.258     
yeartreated~1996   0.1473  .0590  2.50     0.026      
yearcontrol~1996   0.0960  .0523  1.84     0.087     
yeartreated~1997   0.1221  .0461  2.65     0.019      
yearcontrol~1997   0.0834   .0464  1.80     0.094     
yeartreated~1998   0.1275   .0433  2.94     0.011     
 yearcontrol~1998  0.0158  .0435  0.36     0.723     
 yeartreated~1999  0.1060   .0345  3.07     0.008      
 yearcontrol~1999  0.0698  .0435  1.61     0.131     
 yeartreated~2000  0.1047   .0447  2.34     0.035      
 yearcontrol~2000  0.0449  .0449  1.00     0.334     
 yeartreated~2001  0.0999   .0359  2.78     0.015      
 yearcontrol~2001  0.0260   .0556  0.47     0.646      
 yeartreated~2002  0.0561  .0203  2.75     0.016      
 yearcontrol~2002  0.0262  .0325  0.81     0.434     
 constant  4.9012  .3542  13.84     0.000      
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A1.b. Identifying  Assumption Test.  Testing Hypothesis. 
H0 :  yeartreated i + yearcontrol i = 0 
H1 : yeartreated i + yearcontrol i ≠ 0 
 
Year F-Stat. (1 , 14) Prob > F. Stat H0 vs. H1 
1991 1.58 0.2299 H0 
1992 0.73 04066 H0 
1993 1.82 0.1993 H0 
1994 2.24 0.1569 H0 
1995 3.06 0.1021 H0 
1996 1.04 0.3255 H0 
1997 0.66 0.4286 H0 
1998 4.74 0.0471 H1 
1999 0.53 0.4775 H0 
2000 1.12 0.3070 H0 
2001 1.12 0.3079 H0 
2002 0.59 0.4538 H0 
 
 
 
 
A2. Pre-treatment Time Pattern Test Results. 
 
       Robust 
ln Rate fat.   Coef.  Std. Err.     t  P>|t| 
Unemployment  -0.0032 0.0027     -1.16  0.266     
Growth rate   0.0089  0.0051       1.73  0.105     
Motorization   -0.0018 0.0007     -2.57  0.022     
Vehicle-Km   0.0377  0.0452       0.83  0.418     
Education   0.0049  0.0030       1.64  0.123     
Motorways   -0.0508 0.0110      -4.63  0.000     
National Roads  0.0036  0.0023       1.59  0.134     
MLDA    -0.0117 0.0253      -0.46  0.650     
Points License  -0.0002 0.0384      -0.01  0.996     
Random   -0.0034 0.0758     -0.05  0.965     
Before02   0.0145  0.0240       0.61  0.554     
Before+3   0.0159  0.0362       0.44  0.667    
This model also uses year-specific national fixed effects and state-specific fixed effects. Cluster robust 
standard errors are presented.  
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A3. Least-squares Estimates for Semi-logs Models. Age Group and Urban Fatality 
Rates. (Selected results) 
 
The same two-way fixed effects model is applied to these groups of victims. Cluster-robust 
standard errors in parenthesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
A4. Least-squares Estimates for Semi-logs Models. Age Group and Non-Urban 
Fatality Rates. (Selected results) 
 
The same two-way fixed effects model is applied to these groups of victims. Cluster-robust standard 
 errors in parenthesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Independent  
 Variables 
Urban  
Age 20-29 
(21) 
Urban  
Age 30-39 
 (22) 
Urban  
Age 40-49 
(23) 
Urban  
Age 50-59 
(24) 
BAC0.5 
 
    -0.2830**    
 (0.0972) 
 
-0.0370   
 (0.1196) 
 
-0.1074   
 (0.0724) 
 
-0.1319  
 (0.0763) 
BAC0.5 + 
Random Checks 
 
    -0.2947**   
 (0.1031) 
 
-0.0531   
 (0.1167) 
 
 -0.1246*   
 (0.0677) 
 
-0.1310   
 (0.0750) 
Independent  
Variables 
Non-Urban  
Age 20-29 
(25) 
Non-Urban  
Age 30-39 
 (26) 
Non-Urban  
Age 40-49 
(27) 
Non-Urban  
Age 50-59 
(28) 
BAC0.5 
 
-0.0341     
 (0.0561) 
 
-0.1200*  
  (0.0635) 
 
-0.0124    
(0.0467) 
 
-0.0883   
 (0.0908) 
BAC0.5 + 
Random Checks 
 
-0.0341     
(0.0561) 
 
-0.1014  
 (0.0584) 
 
0.0007   
 (0.0511) 
 
-0.0883   
 (0.0908) 
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A5. Least-squares estimates, semi-log model. Alcohol Consumption. 
 
 
Independent 
variables 
 
Alcohol Consumption 
(33) 
 
BAC0.5 
 
-0.0656** 
(0.0297) 
 
Points License 
 
0.0338* 
(0.0174) 
 
MLDA 
 
-0.0687 
(0.0615) 
 
Unemployment rate 
 
-0.0164*** 
(0.0038) 
 
Growth rate 
 
0.0033 
(0.0023) 
 
R-sq 
 
0.50 
   Two way fixed effect model for alcohol consumption. Standard errors allowing clustering by  
  country  are reported in parenthesis.  
 
 
SÈRIE DE DOCUMENTS DE TREBALL DEL CREAP 
 
 
 
 
2006 
 
 
CREAP2006-01 
Matas, A. (GEAP); Raymond, J.Ll. (GEAP) 
"Economic development and changes in car ownership patterns"  
(Juny 2006) 
 
 
CREAP2006-02 
Trillas, F. (IEB); Montolio, D. (IEB); Duch, N. (IEB) 
"Productive efficiency and regulatory reform: The case of Vehicle Inspection Services"  
(Setembre 2006) 
 
 
CREAP2006-03 
Bel, G. (GPRE); Fageda, X. (GPRE) 
"Factors explaining local privatization: A meta-regression analysis"  
(Octubre 2006) 
 
 
CREAP2006-04 
Fernàndez-Villadangos, L. (GPRE) 
"Are two-part tariffs efficient when consumers plan ahead?: An empirical study"  
(Octubre 2006) 
 
 
CREAP2006-05 
Artís, M. (AQR); Ramos, R. (AQR); Suriñach, J. (AQR) 
"Job losses, outsourcing and relocation: Empirical evidence using microdata"  
(Octubre 2006) 
 
 
CREAP2006-06 
Alcañiz, M. (RISC); Costa, A.; Guillén, M. (RISC); Luna, C.; Rovira, C. 
"Calculation of the variance in surveys of the economic climate”  
(Novembre 2006) 
 
 
CREAP2006-07 
Albalate, D. (GPRE) 
"Lowering blood alcohol content levels to save lives: The European Experience”  
(Desembre 2006) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
creap@pcb.ub.es 
